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Abstract
This paper uses a large-scale overlapping generations model to assess the impact of scal rules in
Norway. I apply up-to-date mortality and fertility rates, realistic projections for petroleum revenues
and age proles for government consumption. The model is used to study the economys transition
paths, starting in 2007, implied by the current and alternative scal rules. The current 4-percent rule is
considered as the benchmark and I experiment with four alternatives: a growth-adjusted rule, a spending
rule, constant tax rates and a wealth targeting rule. Due to large petroleum resources, alternative scal
rules give rise to large di¤erences in the timing and level of taxes and the welfare of di¤erent generations.
1 Introduction
A set of scal rules are, in general, economic constraints imposed on the scal authority in order to prevent
excessive government decit and debt accumulation. These scal measures are not economic bads, we worry
about them because of their potential impact on other economic variables. Consequently, scal rules are
usually motivated by some underlying objectives. For instance, Auerbach (2008a) notes the following: There
are at least three important long-term objectives that appear to be associated with concern about debt
and decit: intergenerational equity, economic performance, and scal sustainability. Large decits and
persistent debt accumulation seems to be inconsistent with all those goals. To nance current spending
by debt accumulation instead of taxes involve passing a nancial burden onto future generations. The
consequence could be an increase in future tax burden (or decline in spending), making current scal policy
unsustainable. The implied uctuations in tax rates and spending may in turn a¤ect the performance of
the economy. A well-known example of a scal policy constraining debt and decit is the Stability and
Growth pact of the EU. According to this rule, decit and debt should not exceed 3 and 60 percent of GDP,
respectively. If these criteria are not met, the state may be subject to sanctions.1In the recent decades the US
have experienced a number of rules, for instance decit targets in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings bill which
was replaced by spending targets in the Budget Enforcement Act (Auerbach, 2008b).
In addition to long-term objectives, policymakers might also pay attention to practical and short-term
issues. For instance, the rule should be transparent and easy to implement, time consistent, allow some
deviations for the purpose of short-run stabilization, and prevent decit hikes from governments trying to be
reelected. Fiscal rules are often designed this way; a set of long term objectives is supposed to be reached by
1See the European Community Treaty (1997), article 99,104 and protocol 20
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adhering to rules which are simple, time consistent, disciplining and exible. The Norwegian rule provides
us with a relevant illustration.
The current regime for economic policy in Norway dates back to 2001.2 Norways large petroleum resource
and cash ows generated from depletion was seen as both an opportunity and challenge. At least two
main concerns dominated the discussion leading up to the creation of the scal rule. First, the expected
combination of gradually declining cash ows and sharp increase in age dependent expenditures would put
pressure on public nances in the long run. Second, spending the entire cash ow each year would cause
large uctuations in overall public spending and presumably contribute to short run destabilization and large
sectoral adjustment costs (e.g. excessive public spending would crowd out the traded goods sector). This
would not be compatible with the declared fundamental objectives for scal policy: scal sustainability, fair
distribution within and among generations, economic e¢ciency and short run stabilization. Moreover, the
massive uncertainty attached to future reserves and prices called for cautious spending. It was therefore
decided to adopt a long-term strategy for petroleum wealth management, to server both as a disciplining
device and as guidelines for good economic policy. The key point was to separate generated cash ows from
the spending over the budget. This would facilitate both a smooth phasing-in of wealth, thus avoiding short
run uctuations, and wealth buildup to meet future liabilities. Eeach year the governments cash ow from
oil and gas activity is therefore invested abroad (The Government Pension Fund of Norway), while annual
spending is limited to four percent of the fund. Moreover, the scal budget must be balanced, allowing
the government to run a non-petroleum budget decit equal to the petroleum contribution. To incorporate
exibility, the rule permits some deviation over the business cycle. The choice of four percent was a ..pure
coincidence, and not a general result.., as Martin Skancke (2003, p. 326) puts it. It turned out that it
balanced the considerations of a stable, sustainable, fair and e¢cient development.
What then, should we expect from these scal rules? At the most basic level we would expect them to
translate into actions and not simply remain a statement of the governments intentions. Furthermore, we
expect it to perform reasonably well with respect to the long term objectives. Backward-looking measures
such as debt and decit do not contain all relevant information with regard to the states scal position, and
target trajectories for these measures are only means to an end. What we really care about is the policys
ultimate impact on the underlying objectives. Hence, any proposed target, such as the Norwegian scal rule,
should be made subject to evaluation within the framework of a dynamic general equilibrium model. This
allows me to be forward looking and explicitly and rigorously measure the outcomes for intergenerational
distribution, economic e¢ciency and scal sustainability, taking behavioral responses and dynamics into
2The guidelines and the intentions behind them are found in Ministry of Finance (2001). Other useful references are Olsen
and Skjæveland (2002) and Skancke (2003).
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account. Such models require a lot of simplifying and sometimes unrealistic assumption. But this does not
mean that we should not use economic models to evaluate the performance of actual policies. These analyses
are valuable inputs in any discussion concerning the performance of current policy and how it should be
redesigned, if at all.
In this paper I therefore develop and calibrate a large-scale overlapping generations model for Norway,
and use it to investigate the long-term macroeconomic and welfare implications of simple scal rules. In par-
ticular, I apply mortality and fertility rates projections by Statistics Norway to create a realistic demographic
transition. I also use realistic projections for petroleum revenues and age proles for government consump-
tion. The calibration makes sure that the current Norwegian scal rule was satised in 2006. The model is
used to study the economys transition paths, starting in 2007, implied by the current and alternative scal
rules. The current 4-percent rule is considered as the benchmark and I experiment with four alternatives: a
growth-adjusted rule, a spending rule, constant tax rates and a wealth targeting rule. In all scenarios tax
rates adjust to satisfy the scal constraint. My main ndings are:
 A continuation of the current scal rule gives rise to a short-term tax reduction and a long-term tax
hike. Between 2006 and 2028 labor income taxes are reduced from 39 to 26 percent. From 2028 the
tax rate is increased continually. The long run tax rate is 60 percent. These results are consistent with
previous ndings, e.g. Holmøy and Stensnes (2008).
 Alternative rules create very di¤erent tax rate dynamics. In the growth-adjusted scenario, which
represents a more conservative regime, labor income tax rates are at most 7 percentage points larger in
the short term, and 25 percentage points smaller in the long-term. The lowest sustainable constant tax
rate is 36 percent. In the spending scenario, tax rate is negative the rst two years, and grows rapidly
until it reaches 55 percent at the end of this century.
 Since alternative scal rules create di¤erent tax paths, they necessarily redistribute welfare among gen-
erations compared to the benchmark scenario. In the growth-adjusted scenario, generations currently
alive and those born in early transition years lose. The loss is the equivalent of 2.5 percent of life-time
resources for some cohorts. In terms of consumption and leisure, this represents a 2.5 percent decrease
in all remaining years alive. Future generations gain considerably. Cohorts born in 2050 gain 2.5 per-
cent while the long-run gain is 17 percent. In the spending scenario, current generations gain up to 6.4
percent, while future generations lose up to 7 percent.
 In terms of macroeconomic performance di¤erent tax paths gives rise to di¤erent aggregate outcomes.
Relative to the benchmark scenario, consumption and labor supply is increased (reduced) with up to
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10 (5) percent in some scenarios. Savings is also very responsive. In particular, the spending scenario
induces an 85 percent increase in aggregate wealth the rst decade.
 Only the constant tax rate scenario generates e¢ciency gains relative to the benchmark. However,
for baseline preference parameters, the gain is less than 0:1 of GDP in 2007. A combination of the
growth-adjustment and spending scenarios gives a considerably larger gain, nearly 8 percent of 2007
GDP. Increasing the intertemporal elasticity of substitution from its baseline value, raises the e¢ciency
gain of constant tax rates to 3:6 percent.
1.1 Related work
The pioneering work by Auerbach and Kotliko¤ (1987) has been succeeded by a vast number of papers on
macroeconomic and welfare implications of scal policy in large-scale overlapping generations models. Kot-
liko¤ (1998) provides a ne summary of the model and its use. Among the studies that closely resembles
mine, De Nardi et.al. (1999) is perhaps the most noteworthy example. They calibrate a large-scale over-
lapping generations model for the U.S, incorporating a realistic population projection. Their objective is
to experiment with alternative scal responses to the coming aging of the population. They x a long-run
debt to GDP target and specify alternative nancing schemes along the transition path to a new stationary
equilibrium. The main nding is that, given the current U.S. social security system, a large future increase in
either labor or consumption tax is necessary. Moreover, di¤erent strategies have vastly di¤erent implications
for intergenerational welfare distribution. Nishiyama (2004) conducts a similar analysis for the U.S without
xing a debt to GDP ratio. His main result is that the welfare gains to future generations from an immediate
increase in the payroll tax is much smaller than the welfare loss of current generations. Kotliko¤ et.al. (2001)
considers strategies for reforming the current U.S. social security system, under a constant debt per capita
regime. In their baseline scenario, which assumes a continuation of current scal policy, the payroll tax
increases with 77 percent over the rst three decades. One particular social security reform seems to have a
favorable appearance, namely switching to so-called advance funding. The real wage increases substantially
relative to the baseline scenario, and it distributes the scal burden of population aging more evenly across
generations. In a more relevant case for Norway, Jensen et.al. (2002) calibrate a Danish overlapping genera-
tions model. They consider two scal strategies for coping with population aging, namely tax smoothing and
debt smoothing. By evaluating the outcome using a social welfare function, they nd that tax smoothing is
(marginally) preferred.
These contributions indicate that population aging renders current scal policies unsustainable, and the
way we choose to cope with this problem has potentially major implications for intergenerational distribution
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of welfare. But what about the case of Norway? There are not many attempts to use overlapping generations
models for scal policy analysis in Norway. One contribution is Steigum and Thøgersen (1995). They investi-
gate the welfare implications of consuming the entire petroleum wealth within 40. While being benecial for
the current generations, the consumption scenario has major negative welfare impact on future generations.
This is illustrated by the path of wage tax. Compared to the benchmark scenario, in which wealth-GDP
ratio is kept constant, the consumption strategy allows for short run tax reduction but necessitates a future
tax hike. Their approach is relatively similar to mine. My contribution will be to investigate specic scal
rules, including the current one. Moreover, I develop a more detailed model representing the current state of
the Norwegian economy, applying the most up-to-date population and petroleum revenue projections. I also
have a richer set of tax rates, all of which are distortionary (The wage tax in their model is non-distortionary,
due to exogenous labor supply). This enables me to compare the e¢ciency e¤ects of adopting di¤erent scal
rules.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section summarizes the Norwegian scal outlook. In section 3, I
develop a large-scale overlapping generations model calibrated to the Norwegian economy. In section 4, the
model is used to simulate economic consequences of di¤erent policy scenarios. The nal section concludes.
2 Fiscal outlook
2.1 Demographics and age-dependent expenditures
According to the most recent population projection published by Statistics Norway (see Brunborg et.al., 2008)
Norway is expected to experience a substantial population growth. In their baseline scenario the population
increases from 4.7 million in 2008 to 6:9 million in 2060. Moreover, the age structure is also changing, and
the fraction of people older than 67 years is projected to grow from 0.614 million in 2008 to 1.5 million in
2060. The dependency ratio, the ratio of young (age 0-19) and old (age 67 and older) to the labor force (age
20-66), is projected to grow from 0.64 in 2008 to 0.80 in 2060. There are several factors contributing to this
development. First, the fertility rates boomed in the 1950s and 60s with rates between 2.5 and 3. In the
1970s the rates dropped sharply to about 1.7 before it stabilized at around 1.8 in the 1990s. The projection
is based on a constant fertility rate of 1.85 starting in 2012. Second, life expectancy at birth has grown
considerably over the last century. Currently it is 78.24 for a newborn male and 82.66 for a female, which
is 27 years higher than at the start on the 20th century. The population forecast assumes a continuation of
this trend, with an annual increase of 0.14 and 0.15 years for men and women respectively. Consequently,
life expectancy at birth is 86.3 and 90.2 in 2060. Finally we have net immigration. This component is the
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most important factor explaining population growth. In the baseline scenario it is assumed that annual net
immigration drops somewhat from the current level of about 40000 to 26000 in 2020 before it stabilizes at
20000 in 2040. To get an idea of the importance of this component, the scenario in which no net immigration
occurs produces a population of only 5.07 million. In addition, the dependency ratio increases to 0.85.
There is considerable uncertainty related to such projections, and the above numbers reect the so called
middle alternative. It is possible that some or all components develop di¤erently. The projection therefore
includes scenarios with di¤erent assumption regarding the specic factors. One is already mentioned, the
zero net immigration scenario. Others consist of various combinations of higher/lower growth in life ex-
pectancy, fertility rates and immigration. The projection concludes that population in 2060 will most likely
be somewhere between 5.3 and 8.5 million in 2060, while the dependency ratio ends up between 0.75 and
0.85. Despite the uncertainty, it is widely acknowledged that the eventual aging of the population will have
implications for public nances. The reason is that a large part of government spending is age related, such
as old age pension benets and health care. They are so-called entitlement spending, meaning that public
spending is triggered whenever an agent reaches a particular state (age, health status, employment status,
etc.). In some of these cases the age is the state. In others, the link is indirect. This is the case for e.g. health
care. As the agent ages, he is more likely to reach a state which triggers health care spending. The main
insight is that old agents triggers more spending than young, and hence an aging society would put pressure
on public nances in the long run. Statistics Norway has illustrated the age and sex prole of public spending
in Norway. They dene a part of total government use of resources in 2004 as age and sex related, and then
distributes this across agents according to age and sex. For instance, government age-related consumption
was 62 percent of total government consumption in 2004. The corresponding government consumption prole
for females (per individual) in 2004 is depict in gure 13 .
Now, using age-spending relationship and the population projections it is possible to get an idea of the
size of government spending in 2050, given that public service standards are unchanged. The numbers
are based on the benchmark scenario in an integrated simulation using the CGE model MSG-6 and the
microsimulation model MOSART4 , both developed at Statistics Norway. As a percentage of mainland GDP,
public spending is expected to grow from 49 percent in 2008, to 53 percent in 2050. This is not overwhelming,
but the assumption of unchanged standards is highly unlikely. They would presumably have to increase in
the future, given that an increasingly wealthier population demands increasingly higher quality of public
services.
3The data is provided by Pål Knudsen and Viebeke Oestreich Nielsen, section for public nances, Statistics Norway.
4The data is provided by Erling Kravik, section for public nances, Statistics Norway. It is the outcome of the baseline
simulation in the most up to date calibration of MSG. For a description of the MSG model see, Heide et.al. (2004) For
description of the integrated use of MSG and MOSART, and the main assumption in the baseline scenario see e.g. Holmøy and
Stensnes (2008) and Heide et.al (2006).
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Figure 1: 2004 prole for government age-related consumption (per individual, females). In 1000 NOK (2004)
2.2 Petroleum cash ow and the scal rule
Cash ows from the petroleum sector represent a large part of government revenues. In the 2007 national
budget (table 1) , petroleum revenues amounted to about 30 percent of total revenues, while net cash ow was
larger than the budget surplus. In accordance with the scal rule, this cash ow was invested in the Pension
Fund, and the budget decit was nanced with transfers from the fund. Consequently, the growth in the
fund consisted of petroleum cash ow plus interest and dividends from the fund minus the amount necessary
to balance the budget5 . At rst glance it does not seem that the 4-percent rule was respected. However,
as mentioned previously, the rule allows deviation over the business cycle. In fact, the 2007 structural
petroleum-adjusted budget decit, which removes revenue and expenditure variations attributed to short run
uctuations in economic activity, was NOK 58.9 B. The market value of the fund at the end of 2007 was NOK
1782 B. Although a little less than the permitted, 58.9 B is still fairly in line with the rule. Since the net
cash ow is saved and spending limited to 4 percent, the fund is projected to grow over time. This implies
that the 4-percent contribution also increases. However, as the petroleum resources are depleted, net cash
ows decline. The factors determining the future path of revenue from the petroleum sector are essentially
the planned depletion of oil and gas and the future prices of those commodities. Using numbers from the
baseline projection mentioned above, based on constant 2007 oil and gas prices of NOK 418 per barrel of oil
and NOK 1.97 per sm3 gas, the value of oil and gas production as a share of mainland GDP is projected to
5Let PFt; CFt, Dt and rt denote period t Pension Fund, petroleum net cash ow, non-petroleum budget decit and real rate
of return, respectively. The scal rule requires 0:04PFt = Dt, and thus PFt+1 = PFt + CFt + (rt   0:04)PFt
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National Budget and Pension Fund 2007
Total revenues 1030:1
1: Revenues from petroleum activity 337:4
2: Other revenues 692:7
Total expenditures 715:1
1: Expenditures from petroleum activity 21:2
2: Other expenditures 694:0
Surplus before transfer to Pension Fund 315:0
  Net cash ow from petroleum activity 316:4
= Petroleum-adjusted surplus  1:3
+ Transfer from Pension Fund 2:8
= National budget surplus 1:5
+ Net transfer to Pension Fund 313:6
+ Return on Pension Fund 78:4
= Total Surplus 393:5
Table 1: 2007 central government budget. In NOK billion. Source: table 3.2 Ministry of Finance (2008)
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Figure 2: Social security payroll tax rate (the employers contribution)
decline from 0.3 in 2008 to 0.02 in 20506 . The cash ow from petroleum activity is not identical to the value
of petroleum production (the link is through tax on prot, indirect taxes and dividends from government
owned petroleum rms). Nevertheless, declining petroleum activity inevitably leads to lower net cash ows.
2.3 Public nances
To get an idea of how public nances is a¤ected by declining petroleum revenues and an aging population,
I have to take into account the current scal rule. I can look at the baseline scenario in e.g. Holmøy and
Nielsen (2008). In this simulation the governments annual budget constraint implied by the current scal
rule is satised by adjusting the social security payroll tax paid by the employer. The tax path is displayed
in gure 2 (a similar tax path is found in Holmøy and Stensnes, 2008). There are two notable features,the
U shape, and 2050 tax rate. The path shows that it is possible to reduce tax rates in the short run, but
6Totoal petroleum production also include production of NGL and condensate. Value of total petroleum production is 0.34
of GDP in 2008 and 0.02 in 2050.
starting from 2020 rates must increase. In 2050 it is, nonetheless, still below the 2006 level. The dynamics
is caused by the interplay between petroleum cash ow, demographics and the scal rule. Large cash ows
in the rst decades imply that the Pension Fund grows rapidly. Due to the scal rule, government revenues
(including 4 percent of the Pension Fund) grows faster than government expenditures. This makes tax cuts
possible. However, as the cash ow shrinks and the aging process kicks in, expenditures eventually grow
faster than revenues. To satisfy the scal rule, tax rates are increased continuously from 2020 until 2050
when it still is about 4 percentage points below its 2006 level. This is consistent with the modest increase
in government spending mentioned previously. So, at rst glance the overall scal picture seems to be quite
good, indicating that a future increase in tax burden is unnecessary. Still, Holmøy and Stensnes emphasize
that we should not be too optimistic. As already mentioned, the standard in public welfare schemes are held
constant. Assuming growth in these standards would shift the tax path upwards. Moreover, there are no
reason to believe that the growth in tax rates would not continue beyond 2050. Hence, tax burden must
eventually increase relative to the current level.
The summary of Norways scal outlook illustrates the need for my kind of analysis. With explicit
modelling of overlapping generations, my setup enables me to focus on intergenerational welfare implications
of the current, and alternative, scal rules.
3 Overlapping generations model for the small open economy
The setup follows closely the Auerbach-Kotliko¤ OLG model (AK-model). A detailed description of the
original model is found in Auerbach and Kotliko¤ (1987). My model economy includes consumption and
leisure choice, endogenous retirement, lifespan uncertainty and secular growth. It also incorporates a direct
link between population composition and government expenditures.
3.1 The model
The household sector
At each period7 t a cohort of size Lt is born. Members of any cohort has a maximum age of 90, but
faces a probability of premature death at the end of each period. In the rst 19 periods, the agent is a
child, and for simplicity, entirely supported by the government. When reaching age 19 the agent maximizes
utility over the life cycle by choosing consumption, c, and leisure, l, in each period, constrained by its lifetime
budget. Due to uninsurable mortality risk, agents die with positive wealth, and thus leave unintended bequest.
7One period equals one year. Single subscript refers to period, while a double subscript refers to period and age. E.g. ct;j is
consumption by cohort of age j in period t , while Ct is aggregate consumption in period t.
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The representative agent of a cohort reaching adulthood in year t faces the problem of maximizing a time
separable nested CES function given perfect foresight regarding all relevant economic variables. The problem
is to maximize
1
1  1
t+71X
j=t
j tP 19j;j t+19u(cj;j t+19; lj;j t+10)
(1  1

) (1)
subject to a life time budget constraint dened by
st;j = r
 (1   st ) (at;j + inht;j) + (1  
l
t)wtet;j(Et   lt;j)  (1 + 
c
t)ct;j + bt;j (2)
at+1;j+1 = at;j + inht;j + st;j
at;19 = 0 ; at+72;91 = eat+72
lt;j  Et
 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, is the discount factor derived from the pure rate of time
preferences,  = 1   1, while P
19
t;j is the agents probability of living to reach age j in period t, conditional
on reaching adulthood. The agents savings in period t is st;j and at+1;j+1 is the beginning of period t + 1
wealth. At the beginning of each period he also receives inheritance inht;j which is invested in the capital
market. Borrowing and lending takes place on a perfect international capital market with exogenous interest
rate r .  st ; 
l
t; 
c
t are proportional tax rates on capital income, labor income and consumption respectively.
The wage rate per e¢ciency unit is wt, while the agents human capital prole (his e¢ciency, earnings ability)
is given by et;j . The total available time to allocate between labor and leisure in period t is Et. bt;j is the
old-age pension benet. The instantaneous utility takes the following form
u(ct;j ; lt:j) =

c
(1  1

)
t;j + l
(1  1

)
t;j
 1
(1  1

)
(3)
 is the relative preference weight on leisure and  is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between
consumption and leisure.
To incorporate secular growth, and at the same time allow the economy to reach a balanced growth path, I
cannot use the standard approach of labor augmenting technological change. This is because of the preference
specication. I therefore assume time augmenting technical change. This imply that each generations time
endowment grows at the rate g
Et+1 = (1 + g)Et (4)
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The agents human capital develops exogenously according to
et+1;j+1= (1 + g)ht;jet;j (5)
ht;j increases with age. This is reasonable due to the fact that wages tend to grow over time as the agent
acquire human capital. However, I include an old age productivity drop, implying that ht;j drops when the
agent reaches age 65. The presence of g is to ensure that the wage prole includes secular growth, which
comes on top of growth in human capital8 .
There are no borrowing constraints. To avoid that agents die with negative wealth, I would preferably
include a bequest motive. However, this is not trivial in a model with risk of premature death. Therefore,
I simply assume that agents dying after reaching age 90 must leave positive wealth, at;91 = eat > 0 andeat+1 = (1 + g)eat. This could be interpreted as follows: The agent receives innite dissutility of leaving
bequest at age 90 less than eat, and zero marginal utility of any additional bequest over and above. Hence,eat serves as an imperfect proxy for a bequest motive. A su¢ciently big value will prevent negative asset
positions.
The public old-age pension systemt is kept simple. My aim is to analyze and compare the e¤ects of
adopting di¤erent strategies of managing government wealth. I do not believe that the qualitative conclusions
will change if I include a detailed social security system. Moreover, I would like to keep the analysis simple,
and a complex social security system makes the model harder to solve. I therefore include a dened benet,
pay-as-you-go system, in which pension benets depend on work history but is independent of retirement
choice. All agents qualify for pension transfer when they reach the exogenous eligibility age 65. They receive
a transfer bt;j in each period from then on. The transfer is related to average earnings for the rst 46 years
of adulthood.
bt;j =
f
46
64X
i=19
wt j+iet j+i;i(Et j+i   lt j+i;i) (6)
where 0  f  1 .
To nd the size of any generation I need to adjust for deceased members. I specify lifespan uncertainty
in terms of mortality probabilities mort;j , i.e. as the probability of not surviving to period t and reach age
j, given that you survived to period t  1. The relationship between P and mor is
P qt;j =
jY
i=q+1
(1 mort j+i;i) (7)
Let  t;j denote the size of age j cohort in period t. Assuming all deaths occur at the end of the period,
8The need for time augmenting growth and steepening of wage prole is described in detail in Auerbach et.al (1989)
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cohort size is given by
 t;j = Lt j+1
jY
i=1
(1 mort j+i;i) (8)
To compute the size of a newborn generation I calculate the number of children born by household in fertile
age groups. I let agents in age group 15 to 49 give birth to a fraction of a child. The fraction is determined
by period and age specic fertility rates fert;j . Lt is thus given by
9
Lt =
49X
i=15
fert;i t;i (9)
Bequest is shared equally among households between age 24 and 58. Let BEQt denote total bequest from
period t  1 deceased agents, then the inheritance is given by
BEQt =
90X
i=19
at;i t 1;i 1mort;i + at;T+1 t;T (10)
inht;j =
1P58
i=24  t;i
BEQt
To nd aggregate demand and supply in any period t I sum over all living cohorts, weighted by size. Total
labor supply in e¢ciency units and consumption is
Nt =
90X
i=19
(Et   lt;i)et;i t;i (11)
Aggregate household consumption, saving, wealth, inheritance and social security transfer is
Ct =
90X
i=19
ct;i t;i; S
p
t =
90X
i=19
st;i t;i; A
p
t =
90X
i=19
(at;i + inht;i)  t;i; Bt =
90X
i=19
bt;i t;i; INHt =
90X
i=19
inht;i t;i
(12)
The rm
There is only one good in this economy. Consequently, a country exports and imports the same good.
All gains from trade comes from the ability of the country as a whole to smooth consumption and leisure
intertemporally. The good is produced by a representative rm employing labor and capital. The production
function is constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas
Yt = K

t N
1 
t (13)
Since capital is internationally mobile, it will locate where the rate of return is highest. Hence, equilibrium
9Note that  t;j consists of children for j < 19
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requires equalization of domestic and world rate of return10 .
r = 

Kt
Nt
 1
   (14)
Frome competitive labor markets I get
wt(1 + 
p
t ) = (1  )

Kt
Nt

(15)
Here, p is a wage tax levied on the rm ( corresponds to the employers contribution to the social secu-
rity payroll tax). To nd the desired capital stock, and the corresponding investment demand, I calculate
aggregate labor supply at the going wage wt. Given capital stock I deduce the corresponding investment
demand
It = Kt+1   (1  )Kt (16)
The government
The government issues bonds at a rate equal to the world interest rate and collects taxes on capital income,
labor income and consumption. Although a petroleum sector is not modeled explicitly, the government
receives a net cash ow each period CFt, interpreted as a windfall of income from abroad. This is used to
nance exogenous age-dependent consumption Gt, regular net expenditures Xt , old-age pension benets Bt,
and disability benets Qt
11
Gt =
90X
i=0
dt;i t;i; Qt =
90X
i=0
qt;i t;i (17)
where dt;i and qt;i is consumption and disability benets per individual of age i in period t. Both d and
q increases with a factor of (1+ g) over time, while X increases with a factor of (1 + g) times population
growth. Government savings and wealth accumulation is then
SGt = r
AGt + 
s
tA
p
t +
 
 lt + 
p
t

wtNt + 
c
tCt  Gt  Qt  Bt  Xt + CFt (18)
AGt+1 = A
G
t + S
G
t
Starting in period t , the paths of tax rates and expenditures are constrained by the non-ponzi game condition
lim
T!1
AGT+t(1 + r
) T  0 (19)
10This means that all capital income taxation is resident based.
11Both Xt and Qt consists, in part, of transfers between the private and the public sector. However, non of these transfers
show up in the households budget constraint, and so they have no impact on the allocation of consumption and leisure. They
thus represents unproductive, non-utility generating consumption
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This prevents the government from continually issuing new debt in order to meet interest payments on
existing debt.
Connecting all three sectors gives the economys net foreign asset position. Any excess (shortage) of
public and private wealth over national capital stock, corresponds to the nations net claims (liabilities) on
foreigners. The current account is dened as the change in this position between two periods
CAt = S
G
t + S
p
t   (It   Kt) = A
G
t+1  A
G
t +A
p
t+1  A
p
t   (Kt+1  Kt) (20)
Competitive equilibrium
Denition 1 Let bct = (bct;19; :::;bct;T ) and correspondingly for blt;bat;bbt;dinht;. An equilibrium in this econ-
omy is a sequence of (i) individual allocations
nbct;blt;bat;bbt;dinho1
t=1
, (ii) aggregate labor supply, labor de-
mand, capital stock, bequest, inheritance and pension benets
n bNt; Nt ; bKt; dBEQt; dINHt; bBto1
t=1
, (iii) prices
fcwt; rt g1t=1 and (iv) tax rates and expenditures nb ct ;b lt;b st ;bpt ; bGt; bQt; bXto1
t=1
; such that
1)
nbct;blt;bbt;bato1
t=1
solve the households problem given prices, tax rates and inheritance
2)
n
Nt ; bKt;o1
t=1
solve the rms problem given prices and tax rates
3) Labor market clears bNt = Nt
4) Aggregate inheritance equals aggregate bequest
dINHt = dBEQt
5) The government satises its intertemporal budget constraint.
Since neither individual agents nor the government violates their constraints, I do not have to check that
the country as a whole is not running a ponzi scheme. And since savings does not have to equal investment
I do not have a capital market clearing condition.
Balanced growth path
When the economy reaches a balanced growth path, tax rates and factor prices are constant. Facing
the same prices and tax rates, the only di¤erence between two succeeding generations is that the younger
agents have (1 + g) times more full lifetime resources. This, together with the fact that CES utility function
is homothetic, causes consumption, labor supply, wealth (and bequest) for a cohort of age j to grow with
rate g over time, e.g. ct+1;j = (1 + g)ct;j . Moreover, the population dynamics are stable, implying that
each cohort, and thus the entire population, grows at a constant rate  over time. Consequently, aggregate
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variables grow at rate z = g++ g, e.g. Ct+1 = (1+ z)Ct. As long as the growth of exogenous government
expenditures does not exceed (1 + z), balanced growth will be feasible. Furthermore, if expenditure growth
is smaller than (1+ g)(1+) the ratio of these expenditures to GDP will converge to zero. The assumptions
implicit in my model, ensure that government expenditure components grow at rate z along a balanced
growth path. This is, however, no innocent assumption, and is closely related to Baumols cost disease. A
discussion is found in appendix B. Now, the assumption implies that Xt and Qt grow at rate z, while dt;i
and qt;i must grow at rate g. The cash ow CFt is temporary, and is thus irrelevant for the existence of a
balanced growth path. I conrm the balanced growth property in appendix A
3.2 Solving the model
I use a Gauss-Seidel algorithm to solve the model numerically.12 Variants of this has been described in e.g.
Auerbach and Kotliko¤ (1987) and Altig et.al. (2001). The procedure for solving for the initial balanced
growth path is as follows. First I need to specify how the governments intertemporal budget is to be satised,
e.g. which instrument to endogenize (tax rate or expenditures). Suppose I choose to endogenize one of the
tax rates. I then specify the values for all other tax rates and expenditure components, and make an initial
guess on the endogenous tax rate and bequest. Factor prices are given from the world market. Given scal
variables, factor prices and bequest, the household problem I solved. To do so, I rst I make an initial
guess on shadow wages (Lagrangian multipliers for time constraint) and compute optimal consumption and
leisure. If leisure in any period exceeds time endowment, the shadow wage which puts the agent exactly on
the constraint is calculated. With these new shadow wages, a new optimal consumption path is calculated.
If new and old consumption paths are close the household problem is solved, if not I update my shadow
wage guess and repeat. I then aggregate and recalculate bequest and endogenous tax rate. If new values
are su¢ciently close to the initial guesses, I have found the equilibrium. If not, tax and bequest guesses
are updated and the steps repeated. The algorithm has two loops, one innerloop and one outerloop. The
innerloop solves the household problem given tax rate and bequest guess, by iterating on shadow wages. The
outerloop nds the equilibrium tax rate and bequest.
The transition path algorithm follows the same principle, but it has to take into account that I solve for
more than one cohort. First, a guess on the tax rate and bequest paths from the old to the new stationary
equilibrium is made. I then solve the household problem for all cohorts alive at the time of the shock, and
for all generations born after the shock. I generally solve the model 500 periods ahead, to give the model
enough time to reach the new balanced growth path before it is forced onto the model. After 500 periods I
force the tax rate and growth-adjusted aggregate bequest to be constant.
12All simulations were carried out in Matlab. I checked the uniquness of the solutions by altering inital conditions.
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Calibration Value
Preferences
 0:35 Intertemporal substitution elasticity
  0:05 Pure rate of time preference
 0:5 Intratemporal substitution elasticity
 2:2 Relative preference for leisure
e Human capital prole, Statistics Norway
Demographics
mor mortality rates, Statistics Norway
fer fertility rates, Statistics Norway
Technology
 0:3 Capital share of GDP
g 0:017 Productivity growth rate
 0:05 Capital depreciation rate
r 0:04 Exogenous world interest rate
Fiscal structure
 l 0:39 Labor income tax rate
p 0:13 Payroll tax rate, levied on the employer
 s 0:28 Capital income tax rate
 c 0:19 Consumption tax rate
f 0:56 Pension benet (share of average labor income)
d; q Age-proles, government spending, Statistics Norway
G2006=Y2006 0:162 Age related spending (2006 share of GDP)
Q2006=Y2006 0:032 Disability benets (2006 share of GDP)
X2006=Y2006 0:176 Regular net spending (2006 share of GDP)
Ag2006=Y2006 0:88 Pension fund (2006 share of GDP)
CF2006=Y2006 0:223 Petroleum net cash ow (2006 share of GDP)
Table 2: Summary of calibration
I start the simulations outside steady state in 2007. To do so, an initial distribution of asset is needed. I
let the model create this distribution by starting the simulation from a balanced growth path in 1979. Along
this path the demographics are stable with constant 1979 levels on mortality and fertility rates. The tax
rates and pension system is also constant. From 1980 I use actual mortality and fertility rates, and run the
model to 2006 keeping tax rates constant. This gives me an initial distribution of assets in 2007.
3.3 Calibration
Demographics
Mortality and fertility rates from 1979 to 2007 are estimated by Statistic Norway. From 2008 to 2080
the numbers are based on the middle alternative in the population forecast, also from Statistic Norway13 .
From 2080 the rates are held constant in order to reach a new balanced growth path. I set the mortality
rates for age 91 equal to 1, thus capping maximum age. I also adjust rates for the fact that my model has
a representative agent in each cohort, while the rates are sex specic. I simply sum the mortality rates for
13The numbers are provided by Inger Texmon, section for demographics at Statistics Norway
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women and men and divide by two, and divide the fertility rates by two. This is a crude approach, but still
su¢cient for my purpose. In the stable 1979 population age 19 cohort is normalized to 1. The population
can be summarized by e.g. its old-age dependency ratio, meaning the number of individuals older than 64
divided by the number of individuals in age group 20 to 64. Since population aging is an important feature
of my model it is essential that my calibration at least gets the order of magnitude of this ratio correct.
However, the problem with starting from a stable 1979 population is that this misses the baby boom in the
50s and 60s economy. The implied dependency ratio is 0.4 in 2007 and 0.5 in 2060. In terms of growth, this
is too small compared to the projections made by Statistics Norway. In their forecast the dependency ratio
is predicted to increase from about 0.22 in 2007 to 0.45 in 2060, i.e. a 100 percent increase. To improve the
accuracy of the models population structure I therefore raise the 1979 fertility rates with a factor of 1:3.
The dependency ratio then becomes 0:30 in 2007 and 0:48 in 2060. It reaches 0:55 in 2080 and remains fairly
stable from then on. When doing this I actually implicitly assume a baby boom that was not really a boom,
that is, the relatively high fertility rates prior to my 1979 demographic shock had existed all along. The
exact consequence of this becomes clear when I discuss my benchmark simulation. Moreover, I abstract from
immigration. It turns out that this might have important implications for some of the simulation results. I
comment on this when interpreting the results.
Tax rates
There are four tax rates: a capital income tax  s, two labor income tax rates  l; p, and a consumption
tax  c. I set capital income tax rate equal to 28 percent which is the current at capital income tax rate in
Norway.14 The employers social security payroll tax rate is 13 percent.15 For  l and  c I compute an average
tax rate based on the 2006 National Account.16 Total household labor taxes divided by total household labor
income yields  l = 0:39, and total household indirect taxes divided by total household consumption yields
 c = 0:19.
Government expenditures, petroleum cash ow and wealth
Exogenous government expenditures Gt; Qt ,government wealth A
g
t and petroleum cash ow CFt, are
calibrated to match data in the 2006 National Accounts. Endogenous budget components (labor, capital
and consumption tax revenue, and old age pension benet) are determined by the 1979 simulation. The
remaining component, Xt, is a residual calibrated to ensure that the scal rule is satised in 2006. Since
I assume that exogenous expenditures per capita grows with the rate of time endowment, I simply use the
14 see tabel 4.4, Ministry of Finance (2008)
15The actual tax rate is di¤erentiated according to geographical zones, with values ranging from 14.1 for the big cities and
percent to 0 percent for some regions in the periphery, see Ministry of Finance (2008). The value 13.1 is in line with the MSG
calibration mentioned in section 2
16 I use total household labor income, and labor income taxes. For consumption taxes i use total household consumption and
total household indirect taxes. See Statistics Norway (2007)
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population projections to nd the corresponding 2007 values. Regarding the denition of public nances
and the Norwegian scal rule there are a couple of points worth noting. First of all, the government can in
general be divided into central and local governments. However, the scal rule only applies for the central
government. This means, that in principle, the local governments can run large decits, leaving the entire
government with a decit larger than what the rule allows. In reality, the local government sector does not
run large decits. Actually, at the end of 2006, the entire local government debt was 3:8 percent of mainland
GDP, while for the central government nancial wealth it was 191 percent17 . Furthermore, the scal rule
only applies to the part of government nancial wealth which is invested in the Pension Fund. My focus is
on the Pension Fund, petroleum cash ows and scal rules, so I simply abstract from other nancial assets18
and local governments.
From the 2006 National accounts I nd that government consumption was 26:2 percent of mainland GDP.
To nd the age-related part I use the ratio from 2004, i.e. age-related consumption is 62 percent of total
consumption. Total disability pensions (see Statistics Norway, 2009) was 3:2 percent of output. I distribute
this across age according to the 2004 age-proles. The Pension Fund at the start of 2006 was 88 percent
of output19 . When it comes to the path of petroleum cash ow I employ the Ministry of Finance baseline
projection in St.meld No. 9, 2009 (Ministry of Finance, 2009). It is based on a constant 2009 oil price of 400
NOK per barrel. The cash ow was 22:3 percent of GDP in 2006.
Human capital prole
The prole, h, is estimated using a 2005 Norwegian cross section data set. The estimated equation in
vector form is
log(yi) = constant+ sexi + agei + edui (21)
Labor income, yi, in 2005 is regressed on a set of sex, age and education dummies. The observations are
conditioned on the individual being employed full time in 2005 and in age group 21 to 64.20 When calculating
the age prole I extrapolate the growth rates linearly back to age 19. In addition, using hourly wage data I
can calculate the growth rate in hourly wage for the same age group (males only).21 The two age proles are
depicted in gure 3 The close match is reassuring. I continue with the labor income estimated prole, i.e.
17The relevant GDP measure for my purpose is mainland GDP. In 2006 it was 1580 B, see
http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/09/01/nr_en/tabe-09.html This measure ignores petroleum activity. For nancial
wealth see table 07018 (National account and external trade) in Statbank Norway (www.ssb.no)
18The non-oil decit in the national budget includes interest and dividends on non-petroleum nancial wealth. Since I calibrate
public nances to be consistent wth the scal rule in 2006, those payments will be included in the residual X . It would be
inconsistent to also include the assets in the denition of nancial wealth Ag , since the return on those assets then would be
counted twice. Hence, by convention, these nancial assets are treated in the same manner as the oil resource, namely as a cash
ow
19Value of pension fund was 1390 B, see table 3.2 Minisrty of Finance (2007)
20The estimates are provided by Torbjørn Hægeland, and use Norwegian register data for all full-time, full-year employees in
Norway in 2005. The earnings measure i annual labour earnings. See e.g. Hægeland and Kirkebøen (2007) for more details on
the data.
212005 cross section for hourly wage and weekly working hours. Data set is provided by Manudeep Bhuller, Statistics Norway.
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Figure 3: Human capital proles, age 21 to 64. 1: Labor income. 2: Hourly wage. Age 21 normalized to 1
equation 21. Choosing the other lead only to small changes in life cycle proles for consumption and leisure.
To account for secular growth in wages over the life cycle, I multiply the estimated prole with the (constant)
productivity parameter. Finally, I set the productivity growth rate equal to 0.02 when the individual reaches
age 65. I thereby force agents to retire at age 65. If this was not done, my model would stimulate more old
age labor supply than what is reasonable.22 Moreover, I assume that the prole remains constant over time.
Preferences
The model has four preference parameters ( ;  ; ;  ). There are basically two approaches for choosing
values for these parameters. The rst is to look at empirical estimates. The second is to choose values
such that the model is consistent with some observed features of the economy. In the literature, starting
with Auerbach and Kotliko¤ (1987), a combination of the two approaches is often used. Altig et.al. (2001),
Kotliko¤ et.al. (2001) and Fehr et.al. (2005) set the inter- and intratemporal elasticities ( and ) based on
available empirical estimates, and then choose time and leisure preference parameters ( and ) to create
realistic lifecycle behavior and macroeconomic outcomes. Fehr (1999), uses  and  to create realistic out-
comes, and sets  and  based on empirical estimates. I set the value for  equal to 0:35, which is within the
range of commonly used values in the AK-model literature (see Fehr and Habermann, 2008). The value for 
is set equal to 0:5 to be consistent with the fact that labor supply is fairly unchanged during prime working
age.23 The value for time preferences is  0:051. It is chosen such that, on the initial balanced growth path,
the ratio of per household consumption in age group 40  49 to household consumption in age group 30  39
22Both secular growth adjustment and old age productivity drop is included in e.g. Kotliko¤ et.al. (2001).
23The abovementioned data set on 2005 weekly working hours, indicate that labor supply remains constant between age 38
and 48
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 0:25 0:35 0:6 0:9 2 3:7
  0:075  0:051  0:029  0:0197  0:004 0:001
Table 3: Intertemporal elasticity of substitution and pure rate of time preference
is about 1:1524 . Finally, the leisure parameter is set equal to 2:2, such that, on average, a household allocates
about 40 percent of available time to labor income generating activity during the 46 working years.
Why do I need a large negative time preference? The answer lies in the combined choice of , r and the
targets for consumption growth and labor supply. To see this, we must rst look at the households Euler
equation (see appendix equation A.5, irrelevant variables omitted)
cj+1 = cj
"
1 + (wjej)
(1 )
1 + (wj+1ej+1)
(1 )
# ( )
( 1) 
1 + r
1 + 

(22)
First, increasing the value of  will unambiguously tilt the consumption path upwards, due to the assump-
tion of growing human capital. This will, other things being equal, increase the required . Table 3 reports
di¤erent values for  and the corresponding :25 From this it is obvious that I need an equally unrealistic 
to create a positive time preference. Estimates for  range between 0:2 and 0:75 (see e.g. Fehr, 1999). In
addition, this leads to retirement also when young and a consumption hike at old age retirement. I choose
my initial values because they create more realistic labor supply and consumption proles, and is more in line
with the literature. For instance, a negative time preference of 5:5 and 10:5 percent is used in Auerbach et.al.
(1989). Second, I could simply alter the targets. The most natural candidate is the consumption growth
target, due to the fact that reliable empirical evidence on household age-consumption proles is scarce. How-
ever, this does not seem to help that much. If I reduce the target to 1:02 it will only increase time preference
to  0:041 given baseline value of . And moreover, it requires that relative preference for leisure takes the
astounding value of 9. Disregarding the target entirely, and simply set a positive time preference would lead
to the equally unrealistic outcome of households holding negative wealth over the entire life cycle.
The reason I have to choose among extremes is the exogenous interest rate. For chosen parameter values
the interest rate would adjust upwards in a closed economy setting. This reects the fact that for given
preferences and tax structure, households save too little in order to nance the required national capital
stock. From the Euler equation it is evident that an increase in interest rate leaves room for a larger time
preferences.
other
The fraction of labor income received as pension benet is set equal to 0:56 , implying that an agent
24Using age-consumption data from 1997 to 2007, I nd a ratio of average household consumption in the two age groups equal
to 1:1. The data is found in Statistic Norways StatBank, subject 05, table 04970.
25Changing , leaves  essentially una¤ected
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who works for 46 years receives about 1:25 percent of lifetime earnings. This is in line with the proposed
pension reform (see Fredriksen et.al., 2005). The bequest requirement at age 91 is set equal to 0:1 for an
individual reaching adulthood in 1979. This is a relatively small number, reecting the fact that individuals
asset positions is positive throughout retirement period, hence a small bequest motive is needed in order to
avoid negative wealth.26 The exogenous interest rate and time-augmenting technology growth rate is 4 and
1:7 percent respectively. Annual capital depreciation rate is 5 percent, while capitals share of output is 1=3.
The implied captial-output ratio is 3:3.
3.4 Some comparative dynamics
In this section I will look more closely at individual and aggregate responses to changes in three key variables,
namely wage rate, consumption tax rate and demographics. In order to interpret the simulation results it
is essential to understand these e¤ects. The analysis will be conducted in partial equilibrium, i.e. I do not
consider the feedback e¤ects from changes in labor supply and consumption on tax rates (factor prices are
constant, due to the small open economy assumption). I will consider both the short run (immediate) and
the long-run e¤ects.
The micro e¤ect of aging can be found by looking at equation A.5. The e¤ective discount factor between
two succeeding periods becomes (1  mor)=(1   ). Reduced mortality tilts the consumption (and leisure)
path upwards, and thus boost saving. Replacing 1979 mortality rates with 2080 mortality, increases the
average life cycle asset of a representative household by a factor of 1:78: Moreover, the household now spends
on average 44 percent of available time on labor activity, a 4 percentage points increase. Since retirement
age is unchanged this in turn must boost household life cycle consumption. The macro e¤ect takes into
account the implied change in population structure. To single out the combined e¤ect of changes in behavior
and population structure induced by the models demographic transition, I compare two partial equilibrium
transition paths. The rst simulates a transition starting with the 1979 demographic shock, keeping tax
rates constant. The second replicates the population growth implied by the demographic transition, but
keeps mortality and fertility rates constant (e.g. a population growth of 1 percent is created by increasing
the size of all cohorts by 1 percent). Thus, the latter path ignores the aging e¤ect on household behavior
and population structure, implying that all aggregate variables grow at the trend rate of the economy, i.e.
population growth times technology growth. From 2007 to 2100 the average trend growth is 1:61 percent.
The average labor supply growth is 1:49 percent. Even though individual labor supply increases, growth in
aggregate labor supply is on average smaller than trend growth. The reason for this is the same as the reason
26Households do in fact have a small negative asset position in their rst years as adults. However, their mortality rates are
essentially zero, so at the aggregate level they leave an insigincant negative bequest.
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behind increased dependency ratio, i.e. an older population. Throughout the transition aggregate household
wealth and consumption is higher in the rst than in the second simulation. The average growth between
2007 and 2100 is 2:06 and 1:71 percent for wealth and consumption respectively.
The response to wage changes is analyzed by computing the wage elasticity of aggregate labor supply
implied by the initial balanced growth path. When doing this I keep tax rates and demographics constant.
The immediate elasticity is  0:12 percent, and decreases continually until it stabilizes at  0:29 after 30
years. This can be explained by income and substitution e¤ects. A higher wage increase the relative price
of leisure, inducing households to consume less leisure and more of other goods. This is the substitution
e¤ect. It has a positive impact on labor supply. On the other hand, a higher wage increases the value of
time endowment. Since net supply of time never turns negative (leisure cannot exceed time endowment), the
household becomes wealthier. This is the income e¤ect, and it makes the household want to consume more
of all goods, including leisure. Hence, it has a negative impact on labor supply. Starting from the calibrated
balanced growth path, the income e¤ect is larger than the substitution e¤ect. To understand the short run
e¤ect note that the relative importance of income e¤ects is smaller the closer the household is to retirement
age. Since the immediate e¤ect consists of the combined response of newborns and generation alive at the
time of wage increase, aggregate income e¤ects are smaller in the short run than in the long run. When
it comes to consumption and wealth the impact is always positive, and one percent wage increase raises
long-run aggregate wealth and consumption by 0:77 and 0:71 percent:Finally, a one percent reduction in the
consumption tax rate induce a short-run (long-run) aggregate consumption increase of 0:13 (0:11) percent.
Aggregate labor supply and wealth decreases with 0:05 and 0:03 percent respectively, both in the short and
long run. Hence, the income e¤ect on leisure dominates the substitution e¤ect slightly.
When discussing behavioral responses in the policy experiments, there are essentially three things to keep
in mind. First, the individual e¤ect of declining (or increasing) labor income tax rates. From the perspective
of an individual, a declining tax path stimulate current leisure since households shift labor supply to future
periods when after-tax wages are high. The e¤ect on consumption growth is positive since  > , which
can be conrmed by the Euler equation A5 in appendix A: When we observe a declining tax path we would
thus expect faster growth in household labor supply and consumption. On the other hand, when tax rates
fall, future generations will have smaller lifetime tax burden than current generations. In turn, this leads to
lower future aggregate labor supply and higher future aggregate saving and consumption, according to the
ndings in this section. The nal thing to keep in mind is the aggregate e¤ect the demographic transition.
This boosts growth in household wealth and consumption and reduce labor supply growth.
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Year
Tax
rate
 l
Current
accounta
CA=Y
Pension
Funda
Ag=Y
Consu-
mptionb
(C)
Labor
supplyb
(N)
Private
wealthb
(Ap)
Pension
Fundb
(Ag)
Old-age
pensionb
(B)
Gov.
cons.
(G)
Gov.
exp.
(X)
2007 0:41 0:13 1:18
2017 0:30 0:15 2:57 0:26 0:27 0:33 1:75 0:33 0:23 0:20
2027 0:27 0:14 3:16 0:24 0:18 0:57 0:45 0:31 0:21 0:19
2037 0:29 0:12 3:43 0:21 0:13 0:44 0:22 0:29 0:22 0:18
2047 0:31 0:03 3:48 0:19 0:14 0:25 0:15 0:23 0:22 0:17
2057 0:32 0:05 3:20 0:18 0:20 0:24 0:10 0:15 0:19 0:16
2067 0:34 0:02 2:84 0:16 0:16 0:22 0:03 0:20 0:16 0:16
2077 0:41  0:02 2:51 0:17 0:13 0:16 0:00 0:23 0:21 0:17
2087 0:43  0:03 2:10 0:14 0:19 0:06 0:00 0:16 0:18 0:16
2097 0:45  0:03 1:80 0:12 0:17 0:07 0:00 0:18 0:15 0:15
longrun 0:60  0:03 0:00 0:15 0:15 0:15 0:00 0:15 0:15 0:15
Table 4: Key macroeconomic variables. Benchmark scenario - endogenous labor income tax. a: Share of GDP. b:
Ten-year growth rates
4 Policy analysis
The above model is used to study the economys transition path to a long-run stationary equilibrium under
ve di¤erent policy scenarios. (1) the current 4-percent rule, (2) a gowth-adjusted rule, (3) a no-rule scenario,
(4) constant tax rate scenario and (5) a combination of (1) and (2). In each scenario I consider a) endogenous
labor income tax and b) endogenous consumption tax. The benchmark scenario is the 4-percent rule. The
government can alternatively satisfy its intertemporal budget by adjusting spending. I do not consider this in
my simulations. Hence, the analysis focus on alternative strategies for nancing a given government spending
arrangement (welfare state design). The policy is introduced at the end of 2006, as an unanticipated event.27
Regarding the current rule this might seem surprising, given that it was introduced in 2001. However, since
I start my simulation in 1979 with constant tax rate, I implicitly assume a pre-2007 policy with endogenous
spending, and that the households did not anticipate the 2007 switch to endogenous tax rates.
4.1 Scenario (1a) - the current scal rule
Table 4 reports the macroeconomic e¤ects of the current rule. The second column shows the tax rate
dynamics (also to be found in gure 4, graph 1a), the third and fourth the current account and Pension
Fund dynamics, while the rest present 10-year growth rates in all government budget components (except
for disability pension). The Norwegian 4-percent scal rule leaves large room for scal expansion until about
2025; labor income tax rates can be reduced with 32 percent from current levels. From then on, tax rates
must be raised continually. The long run tax rate implied by the scal rule is 60 percent. A huge current
account surplus is eventually replaced by a decit, while a large short-run wealth buildup is replaced by a
constant Pension Fund when petroleum cash ows disappears in 2061. Due to secular growth in output,
Pension Fund as a share of GDP converge to zero in the long run.
27Regarding the capital stock it is worth noting that I assume that capital stock adjusts to equalize rate of returns also in
2007. If this was not the case (i.e. 2007 capital stock was determined prior to policy announcement) then domestic factor prices
would be endogenous in 2007.
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To understand the dynamics I have decomposed government budget growth into the growth of its various
components. The last column represents what I, in the previous section, referred to as trend growth. This
term deserves a thorough explanation. Imagine that we are on a balanced growth path, with population
growing at gross rate z and technology growing at gross rate d. Aggregate variables grow at rate zd. Now,
suppose population growth suddenly becomes bz. As long as this growth comes about by increasing the size
of all cohorts by the the same factor bz (e.g. population growth through immigration, in which all immigrants
are identical to the locals in terms of assets, human capital, preferences etc.), neither household behavior nor
required tax rate change. Hence, all per capita variables remain una¤ected. In my simulation both behavior
and tax rates do change. First of all, the demographic transition boosts growth in government age dependent
expenditures G and B. This tend to increase the required tax rate. On the other hand, the rapid growth in
the Pension Fund brings about a large 4-percent contribution. Over the course of the coming two decades this
overshadows any growth in age dependent expenditures, setting the stage for lower tax rates. In addition,
both consumption and wealth grows substantially during the rst decades, contributing to further tax cuts.
Labor supply grows rapidly the rst decade, but is on average smaller than trend growth. Eventually, as the
petroleum cash ows shrink, the Pension Fund stabilizes. Because the Fund by now is quite large, its relative
size in the government budget is also large. Thus, any slowdown in growth will have large impact on required
tax rates. In addition, the relative size of age dependent expenditure components increase and consumption
and wealth growth declines. In total this renders the small tax burden unsustainable and the scal rule calls
for continually increasing tax rates. However, around 2045 taxes decline for about 5 years. This is caused by
the post-1979 fertility drop. Large cohorts from the initial balanced growth path dies, while relatively small
cohorts enter retirement age. Hence, the economy experience a decade with declining old-age dependency
ratio.
The dynamics in aggregate consumption, wealth and labor supply is partly explained by the demographic
transition and partly by tax rate dynamics itself. As explained in section 3.4, the aging process tend to make
consumption and wealth grow faster than trend. As mortality rates eventually stabilizes, the growth will fall
back towards trend. This partly explains the high but steadily declining growth. For labor supply the opposite
is true. It also displays quite volatile growth. The initial high growth rate of 27 percent can be explained
by the fact that labor supply drops in 2007 (explaining the immediate tax increase). This is attributed to
intertemporal substitution. The households anticipate a large tax reduction in the near term, and so they
choose to consume more leisure immediately. Moreover, increased leisure imply increased consumption and
thus reduced savings, explaining the relatively slow growth in household wealth the rst decade. At the end
of the century growth in consumption and wealth (labor supply) is below (above) trend growth. Since this
cannot be explained by demographics, it must be because taxes continually increase. Consequently, on an
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aggregate level, increasing tax rates reduce (increase) consumption and wealth (labor supply) growth due to
steadily growing lifetime tax burden. One could wonder why then, the initial decline in tax rates does not
reduce labor supply growth. The reason is presumably that the initial decline is only temporary, and so the
substitution e¤ect is much stronger than the e¤ect of a small reduction in lifetime tax burden.
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Figure 4: Labor income tax rates. Scenario (1a) - (5a).
Compared to Norways scal outlook, and in particular the tax rate path in gure 2, my benchmark
scenario yield essentially the same dynamic picture. The di¤erence is that the persistence of tax cuts is
larger. Tax rates do not reach pre-reform levels until 2075. The explanation is related to the relative
importance of petroleum revenues. My model abstracts from immigration, which, in population projections
is expected to account for the main share of future population growth. Insofar as immigrants only a¤ect
population growth, and leave the relative size of di¤erent cohorts una¤ected, they only have an impact on
trend growth. I could then replicate immigration simply by scaling up the size of the economy. The only thing
not scaled up would be the Pension Fund. Consequently, its relative size would decrease, and its ability to
create tax cuts diminish. Regarding the scal policy comparisons I conduct, these demographic imprecisions
will be present in all scenarios, and therefore not a¤ect the qualitative conclusions.
4.2 Scenario (2a) - growth-adjusted rule
The growth-adjusted rule involve a constant long-run government wealth to GDP ratio. In particular, it
subtracts trend growth from the four percent real return. As a result, the Pension Fund will have a long-
term impact on the economy. This can be seen from table 5. The fund grows rapidly the rst ve decades,
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Tax
Rate
 l
Current
account
CA=Y
Pension
Fund
Ag=Y
Consu-
mptiona
Labor
supplya
Private
wealtha
Pension
Funda
Old-age
Beneta
2007 0:43 0:17 1:15 0:97 1:03 1:00 1:00 1:00
2017 0:36 0:18 2:88 0:97 1:01 0:94 1:13 1:00
2027 0:33 0:18 3:98 0:96 1:01 0:87 1:26 1:00
2037 0:34 0:17 4:85 0:96 1:01 0:83 1:42 1:01
2047 0:34 0:10 5:49 0:97 1:01 0:81 1:59 1:02
2057 0:31 0:14 5:67 0:98 1:01 0:83 1:78 1:02
2077 0:35 0:08 6:13 1:02 0:98 0:89 2:40 1:02
2097 0:32 0:10 5:96 1:07 0:97 1:04 3:22 1:00
2147 0:34 0:08 6:00 1:20 0:93 1:53 6:62 0:95
longrun 0:34 0:09 6:00 1:35 0:89 2:82 1 0:89
Table 5: Macroeconomic e¤ect of growth-adjusted rule - endogenous labor income tax. a: Value relative to benchmark
scenario 1a
before it stabilizes at 6 times GDP, causing a permanent reduction in tax rates relative to the benchmark
scenario. In fact, a 44 percent long-term reduction is made possible. The downside comes in the near term.
Growth-adjusting the scal rule leads to higher tax rates the rst ve decades, it is the inevitable consequence
of a more conservative scal rule. In terms of macroeconomic performances, short-term substitution e¤ects
are still important. However, the incentive to both work and save less for the future is not as strong as in
1a. In addition tax burden is heavier. This triggers larger short- and medium-term labor supply relative
to benchmark, while the opposite holds for aggregate consumption and household wealth. As tax burden
eventually becomes smaller, consumption and savings are stimulated, but labor supply dampened. This is in
line with the behavioral response to wage changes discussed in section 3.4. The welfare e¤ect is summarized
in gure 5
Following e.g. Fehr and Habermann (2008) and Auerbach Kotliko¤ (1987), I measure the welfare e¤ect
as the proportional change in consumption and leisure that would make the individual as well of in the
benchmark scenario as in the reform scenario. The household is better o¤ under the alternative regime if
the change is positive. In gure 5,28 a welfare index value of 1 represents unchanged utility, while e.g. 1.01
imply that the household is better o¤ in the reform scenario than in the benchmark scenario. It would take
a one percent increase in consumption and leisure in the benchmark scenario, in order to be indi¤erent. In
terms of wealth, this represents a one percent increase in full lifetime resources.29 The graph denoted (2a)
displays the welfare e¤ect of the growth-adjusted rule. Cohorts who are retired at the time of reform, are
not a¤ected. The initial young generations lose up to 2:5 percent of full lifetime resource. Early transition
generations also lose, while future generations gain. A cohort born in 2050 gains 2:5 percent of full lifetime
28An individuals age at the time of reform is 19 minus the number on the horizontal axis
29Full lifetime resouces consists of the households current asset position plus the present value of time endowment. In the
appendix I show that an increase in full lifetime resources lead to proportional increase in optimal consumption and leisure.
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Figure 5: Welfare e¤ects of alternative scal rules. Endogenous labor income tax. Scenario (2a)-(5a)
resource. The long run gain is much larger, in fact 17 percent. However, the long run literally means long run
(at least 300 years), so it should not be at the center of our attention. In any case, the reform unambiguously
redistributes welfare from current towards future generations.
4.3 Scenario (3a) - no rule
By no rule I mean that instead of setting the petroleum cash ow aside, the government spends the entire
amount each period, in addition to earned interest on current assets. By doing this the Pension Fund remains
constant at its 2006 level. This scenario is interesting, not because of its practical relevance, but because it
gives us an idea of how a frictionless economy is a¤ected by huge short-term expansionary policy. As I men-
tioned earlier, when discussing the introduction of the current rule, policymakers emphasized the stabilization
aspect of scal rules, implicitly referring to a Keynesian-type economy and issues such as unemployment and
sectoral adjustment costs. In my simulation there are no such issues. Instead I focus on uctuations in
macroeconomic variables and welfare brought about by a short-term expansionary policy. The results are
reported in table 6 .
Tax rates drop signicantly the rst year. Labor income tax decrease from 39 to 2 percent and is further
reduced to  12 percent the following year. Due to steady decline in petroleum revenue, the initial low
levels are far from being sustainable. Taxes instantly start to grow, and reach pre-reform levels in 2041.
Relative to benchmark, consumption and labor supply increase by 10 and 11 percent respectively the rst
year. Consumption remains relatively high for the next three decades while labor supply drops below baseline
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Rate
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Pension
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mptiona
Labor
supplya
Private
wealtha
Pension
Funda
Old-age
Beneta
2007 0:02  0:01 1:07 1:10 1:11 1:00 1:00 1:00
2017 0:16 0:12 0:95 1:08 0:99 1:85 0:36 1:00
2027 0:28 0:08 0:84 1:06 0:95 1:72 0:25 0:99
2037 0:35 0:02 0:73 1:03 0:96 1:44 0:20 0:97
2047 0:42  0:07 0:63 1:00 0:98 1:23 0:18 0:96
2057 0:43  0:02 0:50 0:96 1:02 1:07 0:16 0:96
2077 0:55  0:08 0:38 0:91 1:03 0:79 0:16 1:00
2097 0:55  0:05 0:27 0:88 1:05 0:65 0:16 1:04
2147 0:59  0:04 0:13 0:91 1:03 0:64 0:16 1:05
longrun 0:60  0:03 0:00 1:00 1:00 1:00 0:16 1:00
Table 6: Macroeconomic e¤ect of no rule - endogenous labor income tax.a: Value relative to benchmark scenario (1a)
path. After 50 years consumption becomes relatively low, while labor supply is high. The dynamics can be
explained by looking at tax rates. When rates are lower (higher) than in benchmark scenario, consumption
is higher (lower). The opposite is true for labor supply. The immediate increase, and the subsequent
drop, in labor supply is caused by by a strong positive substitution e¤ect (since rates are expected to grow
substantially from its initial low level). In scenario (1a) the substitution e¤ect was negative. Small initial
tax burden boosts saving and consumption. Because it is an immediate and very temporary tax cut, there
is an particularly strong incentive to save. By 2017 household wealth is 85 percent larger. However, as tax
rates continually increase over time, lifetime tax burden increase and eventually become larger than in the
benchmark scenario. Consequently, consumption and wealth (labor supply) decline (increase) and eventually
become smaller (larger). In the long run, the no-rule scenario is identical to the current scal rule, reecting
the fact that neither strategies preserve the Pension Fund as a constant share of GDP (i.e. petroleum wealth
eventually becomes irrelevant). Welfare e¤ects are large. The no-rule rule correspond to a large distribution
of welfare from future generations towards the current young and adult cohorts. If you are 35 years old at
the time of the reform your welfare gain is the equivalent of 6:5 percent increase in consumption and leisure
in all remaining years. However, if you are born 50 years after the reform the welfare loss is the equivalent of
a 7 percent reduction. It is interesting to note that the initial reduction of government wealth is paralleled
by an increase in household wealth. In benchmark scenario the ratio of government to household wealth is
1:34 in 2017. Hence, in absolute terms the reduction in government wealth is almost entirely matched by
increased household wealth. However, due to overlapping generations, the increase is only temporary while
the decrease in government wealth is permanent.
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2007 0:34 0:20 1:11 0:99 1:07 1:00 1:00 1:00
2017 0:34 0:18 2:64 0:98 1:00 1:11 1:03 1:00
2027 0:34 0:16 3:71 0:97 0:99 0:98 1:16 1:00
2037 0:34 0:16 4:51 0:97 1:00 0:88 1:32 1:00
2047 0:34 0:11 5:06 0:97 1:01 0:87 1:47 1:01
2057 0:34 0:13 5:37 0:98 1:00 0:85 1:68 1:01
2077 0:34 0:08 5:82 1:01 1:00 0:85 2:33 1:02
2097 0:34 0:09 5:80 1:06 0:97 1:00 3:13 1:01
2147 0:34 0:08 5:82 1:19 0:93 1:51 6:43 0:95
longrun 0:34 0:08 5:81 1:34 0:90 2:77 1 0:89
Table 7: Macroeconomic e¤ect of constant tax rates - endogenous labor income tax. a: Value relative to benchmark
scenario (1a)
4.4 Scenario (4a) - constant tax rates
Suppose for a moment that the Norwegian scal rule does not exist. Is the current level of tax rates and welfare
state design unsustainable, in particular, will a continuation of todays tax rates violate of the governments
intertemporal budget constraint? Within my stylized economy the answer is no. Not only is a continuation of
2006 tax rate level feasible, we can in fact reduce labor income tax rates with 23 percent. The lowest feasible
level of tax rates, such that the governments budget constraint is satised with equality, is 34 percent. In
the short run tax burden is thus smaller than in benchmark, in the medium run its larger, while in the
long run its again smaller. The short-term expansion of government wealth is somewhat smaller than in the
growth-adjusted scenario, causing a slightly larger tax burden after two decades. Relative to the 4-percent
rule, a constant tax reform induce a redistribution of welfare from current young to current old working
households and future generations. In the long run, households are better o¤ due to permanently lower tax
burden, the welfare gain is the equivalent of a 16 percent increase in lifetime consumption and leisure. On the
macro side, due to constant tax rates, there is no initial incentive to substitute labor supply intertemporally.
Both labor supply and savings is therefore stimulated in the short run, relative to benchmark. Since a fairly
long period of high tax rates follows, consumption and wealth drops below benchmark paths. In the medium
and long run the development is approximately equal to scenario (2a). This should not come as a surprise.
In gure 4, disregarding the temporary drop in graph (2a) in the 50s and 60s, the growth adjusted tax path
fairly soon (in 2020) stabilizes around the constant tax rate.
It is important to emphasize that a more careful demographic calibration, which encompass immigration,
could potentially make a continuation of 2006 tax rates unfeasible. In that case, the constant tax rate would
be larger than 0:39.
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2007 0:41 0:13 1:18 1:00 1:00 1:00 1:00 1:00
2017 0:30 0:15 2:58 1:00 1:00 1:00 1:00 1:00
2027 0:27 0:13 3:16 1:00 1:00 1:00 1:00 1:00
2037 0:29 0:12 3:41 1:00 1:00 1:00 1:00 1:00
2047 0:31 0:04 3:43 1:00 1:01 1:03 1:00 1:00
2057 0:30 0:08 3:11 0:99 1:03 1:08 1:00 1:00
2077 0:46  0:02 3:26 0:98 0:99 0:92 1:28 1:00
2097 0:44 0:02 3:07 0:99 1:01 0:87 1:72 1:01
2147 0:46 0:02 3:06 1:06 0:98 1:09 3:54 0:99
longrun 0:47 0:03 3:05 1:18 0:94 1:95 1 0:94
Table 8: Macroeconomic e¤ect of wealth targeting - endogenous labor income tax. a: Value relative to benchmark
scenario (1a)
4.5 Scenario (5a) - wealth target
The rule is a combination of (1a) and (2a), in particular it involves following the current scal rule until
petroleum cash ow disappears in 2060, and then switch to rule (2a). In e¤ect, this rule maintains a constant
government wealth to GDP ratio, starting in 2060. The results are reported in table 8.
Due to short- and medium-term equivalence to the benchmark scenario, nothing happens during the rst
three decades. In 2060, when switching from rule (1a) to (2a), tax rates instantly jump (see graph (5a) in
gure 4): A period of relatively high tax rates follows. This enables the government to permanently lower
the long-run tax burden. There are two notable aspects. First, the tax hike induces households to substitute
labor supply intertemporally, thus the increase in labor supply and wealth prior to 2060. For the next three
decades tax rates are higher than in benchmark scenario, leading to lower consumption and wealth and a
small increase in labor supply. In the long run the e¤ects are qualitatively the same as in scenario (2a), albeit
of a smaller magnitude. Moreover, as long as we switch to a growth adjusted rule sometime in the future,
we can avoid passing a large scal burden onto future generations. In my simulation long run tax rate is 22
percent lower than in benchmark. Compared to the other reforms, this one therefore entail less redistribution
of welfare.
4.6 Endogenous consumption tax
Table 9-13 reports the macroeconomic e¤ect of scenario (1b) to (5b) with endogenous consumption tax. Figure
6 and 7 display tax dynamics and welfare e¤ects. Regarding tax rates, the results are qualitatively the same
as under endogenous labor income tax. The long-run tax rate implied by current scal rule is 55 percent, but
rates do not reach pre-reform levels until 2070. The lowest sustainable constant tax rate is 16 percent. Under
the growth adjusted rule, tax rates stabilizes around the constant tax rate in 2020 and beyond , except for
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the temporary drop in the 50s and 60s. The no-rule scenario is still the most extreme rule, with tax rates
dropping to  39 percent two years after the reform, followed by rapid and persistent growth.
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Figure 6: Consumption tax rates. Scenario (1b) - (5b).
Concerning welfare, one major di¤erence between consumption and labor income tax adjustments is that
the former also a¤ects households who are retired at the time of reform. Inital old and young cohorts benet
a lot in the no-rule scenario. In fact, the gains range from 20 to 30 percent of remaining life time wealth
for age group 85 to 90 in 2007. These gains come partly at the expense of future transition generations who
experience a welfare loss of up to 5 percent. Scenario (4b), with its constant tax rates, also involve large
welfare gains for initial old cohorts. In this case, future transition generations also gain. The losers are
the initial working cohorts. Fiscal rule (2b) involve a large welfare improvement for households born during
transition and in the new stationary equilibrium. The long-term utility gain is 12 percent. Both current
young and old cohorts lose. Finally, wealth targeting still induce relatively little welfare redistribution.
On the macroeconomic side, the Pension Fund continue to dominate. It is the main driving force behind
tax cuts and hikes. Again, there is some feedback from behavioral responses. In contrast to scenario (1a),
the immediate action in the benchmark scenario (see table 9) is greatest in consumption. It grows with 30
percent over the rst decade, 10 percent more than trend growth. Growth remains higher than trend the next
two decades. The main reasons, in addition to an increase in life expectancy, is the downward trend in tax
rates. It has two e¤ects, both of which contribute to relatively high growth rates. First, falling consumption
tax rates induce households to postpone consumption. Second, from the perspective of a newborn, lifetime
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Figure 7: Welfare e¤ects of alternative scal rules. Endogenous consumption tax. Scenario (2b)-(5b)
tax burden declines over the course of the rst two or three decades. Thus, early transition cohorts have
lower lifetime tax burden than cohorts alive at the time of reform. This tends to make aggregate consumption
grow, since consumption increases in response to a permanently lower tax burden. When tax rate starts to
increase, the revers holds, partly explaining the slowdown in consumption growth. The other reason is again
that the aging process also slows down.
Regarding the reforms, whenever tax rates are high (low), consumption tend to be low (high), relative
to benchmark scenario. The revers holds for labor supply and aggregate wealth. This is in line with the
behavioral response to permanent tax cuts found section 3.4. The exception is the no-rule reform. Even
though tax burden is relatively small initially, it is expected to grow substantially. In this case, the incentive
to save for the future in order to smooth consumption and leisure is so strong that wealth in 2017 in fact is
35 percent higher than in benchmark scenario.
4.7 E¢ciency vs. redistribution
Since tax rates distort behavior, any redistribution of welfare can partly be ascribed to e¢ciency gains and
losses. In order to single out these e¤ects, and thus identify whether a reform represents a potential Pareto
improvement, I introduce a Lump Sum Redistribution Authority (LSRA) (see Auerbach and Kotliko¤, 1987,
Nishiyama and Smetters, 2005, and Fehr and Habermann, 2008). The task of this authority is to collect and
distribute lump sum taxes and transfers such that all households enjoy the same utility level in the reform
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scenario as in the benchmark scenario. In the rst transition period, all cohorts currently alive pay a lump
sum tax (transfer, if negative) such that their utility is exactly equal to benchmark utility. Likewise, in each
subsequent period, all households reaching pay a lump sum tax upon reaching adulthood. Consequently, all
cohorts who are worse o¤ under the alternative scal regime is compensated with a lump sum transfer, while
all those who are better o¤ must pay a lump sum tax. In this new LSRA scenario, no redistribution of welfare
occurs. If the net present value of required taxes over transfers is positive, the reform is Pareto e¢cient after
lump sum redistribution. All households enjoy unchanged utility, and yet there is a surplus of resources. The
LSRA is free to distribute this surplus to any particular agent, making at least someone strictly better o¤.
A negative surplus implies that the LSRA must levy lump sum taxes on some agents, making them strictly
worse o¤. In that case, the reform reduces e¢ciency.
Regarding scenario (2a)   (5a), the only scal rule which increase e¢ciency is the constant tax rule.
However, the e¢ciency gain is only minor, and the LSRA surplus amounts to less than 0:1percent of 2007
GDP. The growth-adjusted rule involves an e¢ciency loss of 7 percent of GDP, while the no-rule scenario
generates a 1:3 percent loss. In addition to the above policy scenarios I experiment with a combination of
(2a) and (3a). In this scenario the government spends the growth-adjusted return on the Fund, in addition
to 40 percent of the annual cash ow each year. This rule leaves room for reduction in tax burden both in
the short and long term relative to the benchmark scenario. In the medium term tax burden is higher. The
e¢ciency gain is 8 percent of 2007 GDP, indicating that an e¢cient time pattern for tax rates at least has the
following properties: Lower long-term tax burden and an immediate, and temporary, tax reduction relative
to the benchmark scenario.
These results are presumably conditional on the preference parameters chosen. For instance, I have a
fairly low intertemporal substitution elasticity, which might explain why constant tax rates do not give rise
to a higher e¢ciency gain. Indeed, redoing all simulations with  = 0:6 and  =  0:075 (see table 3)
increases the e¢ciency gain induced by constant labor income tax rates to 3.6 percent of 2007 GDP. This is
not surprising. The more sensitive behavior is to time-varying prices, the greater are the distortions arising
from uctuating tax rates.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I have illustrated the importance of scal rule specication in a stylized large-scale overlapping
economy. Due to large petroleum resources, alternative scal rules give rise to large di¤erences in the timing
and level of taxes and the welfare of di¤erent generations. The current Norwegian rule is motivated partly by
long-term concerns such as scal sustainability and, ultimately, intergenerational welfare distribution. My
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results show in what way a scal reform would a¤ect these objectives. The issue of what rule to prefer would
in turn depend on the particular weight policymakers put on the welfare of di¤erent generations.
The model contains many simplifying and unrealistic assumption. It also abstracts from the fact that
many important projections, such as future value petroleum revenue and demographics, are variables of
considerable uncertainty. In addition, it does not encompass immigration. However, my stylized perfect
foresight model does provide a rst approximation. Petroleum revenues, demographics and scal rules, will
be e¤ects of rst order, no matter how I chose to model the economy.
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A Solving the household problem
The problem (dropping time subscripts on individual variables, i.e. period equals age, and age 1 is rst year
of adulthood)
max
fct;ltg
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a1 = 0; a73 = ea
ct > 0
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rewriting the budget constraint
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The rst order conditions with respect to period j consumption and leisure becomes (letting  be the
Lagrangian multiplier with respect to the budget constraint)
cj : 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Hence, the intratemporal optimality condition is
lj =

(1 +  cj)
 j + j

cj (A.4)
From this we can identify  as the percentage change in the ratio lj to cj in response to a one percent increase
in the wage rate. Eliminate leisure in consumption FOC
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Forwarding one period we get
cj+1
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equalize with period j rst order condition to get the intertemporal optimality condition
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From this we identify  as the percentage change in the ratio cj+1 to cj in response to a percentage
increase in the after-tax gross return (1+ r(1   sj+1)). In optimum, if time constraint is binding, i.e. agent
retires, the shadow wage must satisfy
j = (1 + 
c
j)

cj
Ej
 1

   j (A.6)
To conrm the balanced growth properties, note that from the intertemporal and intratemporal optimality
conditions we can solve for period 2::T consumption and period 1::T leisure as linear functions of period
1 consumption. These functions has variables which are stationary along the balanced growth path as
parameters. Let cj = c1Dj and lj = c1Hj ; j = 1::T denote these functions, with D1 = 1. Due to the
linearity, we can solve for period 1 consumption using the lifetime budget constraint.
c1 =
P72
t=1
tY
i=1
(1 + r(1   sj+1))
 1 [ tEt + (1 + r
(1   st ))inht   1tea]
P72
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(A.7)
The numerator is the agents full lifetime resource. Note that this is the closed form solution for consump-
tion under the maintained assumption of no retirement. When some time constraints bind, the problem is
complicated by the presence of shadow wages in the denominator, and we would have to solve for c1 numeri-
cally. Let c1, denote the unique optimal solution. Suppose life time resources is increased by a factor (1+ g),
and that this comes about by increasing time endowments (Et), inheritance (inht) and bequest requirement
(ea) with the same factor. My claim is that this lead to proportional increase in consumption and leisure at
all ages of (1+ g). Clearly, if neither fHig
T
i=1 nor fDjg
T
j=1 change, c1 and fcj ; li g
T;T
j=2;i=1 will increase by the
factor (1 + g). The only way H and D can change is if shadow wages change. But from A.6, we see that
shadow wages are una¤ected since the ratio cj=Ej is unchanged. Hence, a proportional increase in c
 and l
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of (1 + g) satises A.7, and is therefore the optimal solution.
Now, by assumption Et; eat grows with rate g over time . Lets assume that the same is true for inht. (
reintroducing time subscripts on individual variables, inht;j = inht 1;j(1 + g)) The only di¤erence between
generations born in period t and t + 1 is that the latter has (1 + g) more full lifetime resources than the
former. Then due to the linearity between c1 and (cj ; lj ; aj), aggregate wealth, consumption, labor supply
grow with rate z = g + + g. Moreover, this also imply that aggregate bequest grows with rate z. Hence,
inht will in fact grow with rate g. Consequently, the balanced growth path is an equilibrium.
B Baumols cost disease and the size of the public sector
Baumols disease (see Baumol, 1967) basically says that if a sector of the economy lags behind in productivity
growth, it will experience increasing cost per unit of production over time. Applied to the public sector the
argument goes like this. Productivity growth in the private sector results in higher wage per labor hour. Since
the labor market is integrated, the government has to pay the same wage to its employees as the private
sector does. However, government production is subject to a lower productivity growth, hence their cost per
unit of output increases. To illustrate suppose an economy consist of a private and a public sector. Both
sector use a single input, labor, and the production functions are
ypt = A
p
tL
p
t
ygt = A
g
tL
g
t
for private and government production respectively. Equilibrium in the labor market requires Lpt + L
g
t = Lt
where Lt (total number of workers) grows with rate , i.e. Lt = Lt 1. Competitive markets implies that
workers are paid their marginal product
wt = A
p
t
thus, government cost function, in terms of the private good, is
c(ygt ) =
ygt
Agt
wt
The government runs a balanced budget and nances its costs by collecting a wage tax  t, hence
 t =
c(ygt )
Ltwt
=
ygt
AgtLt
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Now, suppose that private sector productivity growth is given by Apt = 
pApt 1, 
p > 1, while government
productivity is constant, i.e. g = 1. Moreover, suppose government production requirement is given by
ygt = sLt, where s a constant production per worker (standards). What are the implication for government
costs, taxes and employment? From the balanced budget requirement and production requirement we see
that the tax rate is constant and employment grows at rate , . From the cost function we see that costs grow
at rate p. If we ow make the additional assumption that government standards grow, say at rate  > 1, we
see that government taxes grow at rate , while employment grows at rate . This is not sustainable in the
long run. Eventually, the government use all resources in the economy, i.e. Lgt = L and  t = 1. The opposite
conclusion follows if we assume that  < 1. A necessary and su¢cient condition for this not to happen is
that g = , i.e. growth in government standards must equal growth in government productivity. If we add
xed costs Ft we can write the cost function as
C = c(ygt ) + Ft
Assuming g =  we need the additional requirement that xed costs grow at rate p.
Insofar government production is highly labor intensive, and transfers to households are indexed to wage
growth, the assumption that government expenditures grow with p is plausible. When relating this to my
model, it is important too keep in mind that I do not model government production. Hence, my expenditure
growth assumption is a proxy for government production. However, including government production with
labor as the only input, would only a¤ect the capital stock in my model.
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Year
Tax
rate
c
Current
accounta
CA=Y
Pension
Funda
Ag=Y
Consu-
mptionb
(C)
Labor
supplyb
(N)
private
wealthb
(Ap)
Pension
Fundb
(Ag)
Old-age
pensionb
(B)
Gov.
cons.
(G)
Gov.
exp.
(X)
2007 0:22 0:17 1:14 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
2017 0:08 0:13 2:59 0:30 0:21 0:30 1:75 0:33 0:23 0:20
2027 0:05 0:10 3:19 0:23 0:18 0:40 0:45 0:30 0:21 0:19
2037 0:08 0:09 3:40 0:18 0:15 0:35 0:22 0:30 0:22 0:18
2047 0:12 0:03 3:40 0:17 0:15 0:25 0:15 0:24 0:22 0:17
2057 0:13 0:04 3:14 0:17 0:19 0:25 0:10 0:16 0:19 0:16
2067 0:17 0:02 2:80 0:15 0:16 0:24 0:03 0:21 0:16 0:16
2077 0:25  0:01 2:42 0:15 0:15 0:20 0:00 0:24 0:21 0:17
2087 0:28  0:01 2:05 0:15 0:18 0:14 0:00 0:16 0:18 0:16
2097 0:31 0:00 1:77 0:13 0:16 0:15 0:00 0:18 0:15 0:15
longrun 0:55  0:01 0:00 0:15 0:15 0:15 0:00 0:15 0:15 0:15
Table 9: Key macroeconomic variables. Benchmark scenario - endogenous consumption tax. a: share of GDP. b: Ten
year growth rates
Year
Tax
Rate
 c
Current
account
CA=Y
Pension
Fund
Ag=Y
Consu-
mptiona
Labor
supplya
Private
wealtha
Pension
Funda
Old-age
Beneta
2007 0:27 0:20 1:11 0:96 1:02 1:00 1:00 1:00
2017 0:17 0:18 2:89 0:95 1:01 1:00 1:13 1:00
2027 0:14 0:15 4:00 0:95 1:01 0:96 1:26 1:01
2037 0:15 0:15 4:82 0:97 1:00 0:92 1:42 1:01
2047 0:14 0:11 5:43 0:99 1:00 0:89 1:59 1:01
2057 0:12 0:12 5:66 1:01 0:99 0:88 1:78 1:01
2077 0:17 0:08 5:96 1:04 0:98 0:87 2:40 1:00
2097 0:14 0:08 5:91 1:09 0:96 0:88 3:22 0:98
2147 0:15 0:08 5:93 1:16 0:94 0:91 6:62 0:95
longrun 0:15 0:08 5:92 1:24 0:92 0:94 1 0:92
Table 10: Macroeconomic e¤ect of growth-adjusted rule - endogenous consumption tax. a: Value relative to benchmark
scenario (1b)
Year
Tax
Rate
 c
Current
account
CA=Y
Pension
Fund
Ag=Y
Consu-
mptiona
Labor
supplya
Private
wealtha
Pension
Funda
Old-age
Beneta
2007  0:25 0:00 1:14 1:32 1:00 1:00 1:00 1:00
2017  0:09 0:04 0:94 1:11 1:00 1:34 0:36 0:99
2027 0:07 0:03 0:80 1:00 1:00 1:37 0:25 0:99
2037 0:18 0:03 0:69 0:97 1:01 1:29 0:20 0:99
2047 0:27  0:02 0:59 0:94 1:02 1:23 0:18 1:00
2057 0:30 0:01 0:49 0:92 1:03 1:17 0:16 1:00
2077 0:46  0:02 0:37 0:90 1:03 1:03 0:16 1:03
2097 0:49  0:01 0:27 0:91 1:03 0:98 0:16 1:03
2147 0:53  0:01 0:13 0:95 1:02 0:97 0:16 1:03
longrun 0:55  0:01 0:00 1:00 1:00 1:00 0:16 1:00
Table 11: Macroeconomic e¤ect of no rule - endogenous consumption tax. a: Value relative to benchmark scenario
(1b)
41
Year
Tax
Rate
 c
Current
account
CA=Y
Pension
Fund
Ag=Y
Consu-
mptiona
Labor
supplya
Private
wealtha
Pension
Funda
Old-age
Beneta
2007 0:16 0:19 1:11 1:01 1:03 1:00 1:00 1:00
2017 0:16 0:17 2:66 0:96 1:01 1:07 1:04 1:00
2027 0:16 0:15 3:74 0:94 1:01 1:01 1:18 1:01
2037 0:16 0:15 4:56 0:96 1:00 0:95 1:35 1:01
2047 0:16 0:10 5:12 0:98 1:00 0:93 1:50 1:01
2057 0:16 0:12 5:44 0:99 0:99 0:90 1:72 1:01
2077 0:16 0:08 5:89 1:04 0:98 0:86 2:38 1:00
2097 0:16 0:08 5:88 1:08 0:97 0:87 3:21 0:99
2147 0:16 0:08 5:89 1:16 0:94 0:91 6:58 0:95
longrun 0:16 0:08 5:90 1:24 0:92 0:95 1 0:92
Table 12: Macroeconomic e¤ect of constant tax rates - endogenous consumption tax. a: Value relative to benchmark
scenario (1b)
Year
Tax
Rate
 c
Current
account
CA=Y
Pension
Fund
Ag=Y
Consu-
mptiona
Labor
supplya
Private
wealtha
Pension
Funda
Old-age
Beneta
2007 0:22 0:17 1:14 1:00 1:00 1:00 1:00 1:00
2017 0:08 0:13 2:58 1:00 1:00 1:00 1:00 1:00
2027 0:04 0:10 3:18 1:00 1:00 1:01 1:00 1:00
2037 0:08 0:09 3:38 1:00 1:00 1:02 1:00 1:00
2047 0:11 0:04 3:38 1:00 1:01 1:04 1:00 1:00
2057 0:12 0:05 3:13 1:00 1:01 1:06 1:00 1:00
2077 0:31 0:03 3:11 0:98 1:00 0:98 1:28 1:01
2097 0:30 0:04 3:06 1:00 1:00 0:93 1:72 1:00
2147 0:32 0:03 3:06 1:06 0:98 0:93 3:54 0:99
longrun 0:32 0:04 3:06 1:13 0:96 0:97 1 0:96
Table 13: Macroeconomic e¤ect of wealth targeting- endogenous consumption tax. a: Value relative to benchmark
scenario (1b)
42
